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The Central Committee for Peace and Development in Arakan State convene in Napyidaw on August 9. (Photo: Myanmar State Counsellor Office / Facebook)

By Lawi Weng
The Irrawaddy
August 17, 2016

RANGOON — Plans are underway to form a new commission to resolve the communal and humanitarian crisis in Arakan State, which will include Muslim and Buddhist Arakanese representatives—but from Rangoon rather than Arakan State.

The new nine-member commission is to play a consultative role in Arakan State—soliciting views from local Buddhist and Muslim communities, to be forwarded to the central government, which is keeping a tight rein on the region and delegating few decisions to state-level leaders.

The news was imparted during meetings in the state capital Sittwe on Monday, conducted separately with Buddhist Arakanese and Muslim Rohingya “community leaders” by the Central Committee for Peace and Development in Arakan State—a body chaired by State Counselor Aung San Suu Kyi, involving Union-level ministers and the Arakan State Chief Minister.

Suu Kyi was absent from the meetings. Lt-Gen Ye Lwin, the Union Minister for Border Affairs, was the highest-ranking member of the committee present.

The new nine-member commission will include three members from “the international community”—The Irrawaddy could not ascertain who this referred to—two Buddhist Arakanese members, two Muslim members, and two government representatives, according to Tha Pwint, a retired Arakanese lawyer from Sittwe who was present at one of the Monday meetings.

He said that Arakanese representatives in their meeting with the high-level committee had expressed dissatisfaction that the Muslim and Buddhist Arakanese members of the new commission would not be local to Arakan State, but be from Rangoon. No objections were reported from Rohingya representatives during their own meeting.

One of the proposed Buddhist Arakanese representatives is Win Mya, the current chairman of Burma’s National Human Rights Commission, which has been widely criticized as ineffective since its formation in 2011.

One of the proposed Muslim representatives—who is seemingly not required to be Rohingya or “Bengali,” as most Burmese term them, or have actual links to Arakan State—is Aye Lwin, a Rangoon-based religious authority and member of Burma’s Interfaith Friendship Organization. The other Arakanese and Muslim representatives have yet to be revealed.

Rohingya and Buddhist Arakanese self-described community leaders, speaking to The Irrawaddy, expressed skepticism over the ability of the new commission to resolve the communal conflict, which has been largely frozen since anti-Muslim violence in 2012 and 2013.

Aung Win, a Rohingya rights activist from Sittwe who also joined one of the Monday meetings, said he would only be satisfied when “direct action” is taken by the central government in Arakan State, suggesting that the new commission is a distraction.

“The day the government gets involved directly, will be the day when our problems can be solved,” he said.

Tha Pwint, the local Arakanese retired lawyer, said the crisis could be resolved only with the imposition of the rule of law.

He accused the government of “not taking action” against “illegal migrants who come to stay in our region”—a reference to the largely stateless Rohingya, whose claim to belonging to Arakan State is strongly denied by most Buddhist Arakanese, and much of the wider Burmese public.

Suu Kyi may visit Arakan State at the end of this month, along with the new commission, and consult with community leaders from both sides, according to Aung Win.

Demonstrators, including Ashin Parmoukkha and Win Ko Ko Latt, are pictured at the protest outside the US Embassy on April 28, 2016. (Photo: Myo Min Soe / The Irrawaddy)

By San Yamin Aung
The Irrawaddy
August 17, 2016

RANGOON — The Kamayut Township police have brought charges against seven Burmese nationalists on Tuesday who, in April, protested outside the US Embassy in Rangoon against the American mission’s use of the word “Rohingya.” A trial is scheduled for August 30.

Hundreds of protesters, including Buddhist monks, held a demonstration outside the US embassy on April 28 in Rangoon. They condemned the embassy for using the term “Rohingya” in a statement issued on April 20 after more than 18 people belonging to the Rohingya minority were killed when their boat sank off the coast of Sittwe, Arakan State.

A police officer from the Kamayut police station told The Irrawaddy that they opened the case against the seven protesters under Article 19 of the Peaceful Assembly Law, accusing those involved of “illegal assembly.” Among the charged are three monks, including Ashin Parmoukkha, formerly a prominent member of the ultranationalist organization best known by its Burmese acronym—Ma Ba Tha. Win Ko Ko Latt of the Myanmar Nationalist Network also faces charges.

Ashin Parmoukkha said that Win Ko Ko Latt originally sought permission to protest in front of the US Embassy, but the police put forward the Bo Sein Hman grounds in Rangoon’s Bahan Township as an alternative protest site. The group instead gathered first in front of Rangoon University, before marching to the nearby US Embassy.

“We are not guilty,” the monk said. “We just protested since the US ambassador used the term ‘Rohingya.’ The ones who use that term are cunning. And I didn’t participate in the march. I just gave a speech there.”

The protesters reject the term Rohingya—with which the Muslim minority self-identifies—and instead refer to the group as “Bengali,” implying that they are migrants from neighboring Bangladesh. Burma’s 1982 Citizenship Law does not recognize the Rohingya among the country’s 135 official ethnic groups, contributing to widespread statelessness for the community.



August 17, 2016

There’s no denying that there can’t be a quick fix for the Rohingya issue in Myanmar. But how much more time does the new government need to, at the very least, acknowledge it?


The transition from long-standing authoritarian, military administration to a democratic one was, of course, never expected to be an easy task for the new rulers, especially when their predecessors have left them with challenges, including failing economy, flourishing drug trade and fragile peace with ethnic minorities.

Yet, Myanmar’s people had many hopes when their country’s human rights champion and Nobel Peace Prize winner Aung San Suu Kyi’s political party National League for Democracy (NLD) won a parliamentary majority last November.

While Suu Kyi was constitutionally barred from becoming president, she nevertheless became the de facto ruler as she assumed the responsibilities of minister of foreign affairs of Myanmar and the minister of president's office.

So far, she has touched upon issues from economic development to illegal cross-border trade. But the one problem she appears to be hesitant to tackle is that of the persecution of religious-ethnic minority Rohingya.

Myanmar is a 53 million-strong Buddhist majority country that includes a diverse set of ethnic minorities – but the Rohingya people, despite being a population of nearly 1.3 million people and living there for centuries, are not one of them.

Rohingya Muslims in Myanmar are officially stateless. The government regards them as illegal immigrants from Bangladesh and denies them citizenship. On the other hand Bangladesh has refused to grant Rohingyas refugee status since 1992.

The situation grew uglier for them in 2012, when Ashin Wirathu launched an anti-Muslim genocidal campaign, which set off a wave of bloodshed, resulting in hundreds of deaths of Rohingya Muslims, leaving more than 140,000 left homeless and over 100,000 forced to flee.

It became worse due to former Burmese President Thein Sein’s criminal silence over the actions of extremist Buddhists.

Many believed things would change for the better after Suu Kyi’s ascension to power. After all, she is someone who spent 15 years under house arrest for her pro-democracy stance and human rights activism.

But things have not changed, and by the looks of it, they are not going to change anytime soon either.

Granted, expecting a quick fix for a problem of this magnitude is naïve and impractical. However, the problem with Suu Kyi, when it comes to the Rohingya issue, is that she seems as disinterested to solve it as her Thein Sein, which would yield the same disastrous results from his rule.

Hopes for any betterment dimmed even further when she banned the term “Rohingya” and instead asked foreigners to refer to them as “people who believe in Islam in Rakhine state.” By doing so, she essentially gave a major victory to all the Buddhist nationalists and extremists who want to get rid of the Rohingya from Myanmar.

Thein Sein was a military ruler who believed in appeasing Buddhist extremists to maintain his power, rather than focusing on human rights abuses being committed against an unwanted people.

But why is Aung San Suu Kyi adopting the same callous approach? What is her excuse?

By Lucy Purdon
The Myanmar Times
August 16, 2016

Since Myanmar’s landmark election in November 2015, the National League for Democracy government has publicly condemned the use of so-called hate speech on several occasions and indicated that a new law may be drafted to tackle the problem. The issue is particularly evident in online attacks against Muslims, women and LGBT people. While Muslims receive most of such attacks, women have also received anonymous threats for standing up for women’s rights and for LGBT people targeted for abuse.

A supporter of nationalist group Ma Ba Tha speaks in Yangon on May 22. The line between free speech and hate speech can be hard to define. (Aung Htay Hlaing/The Myanmar Times)

Since the government was installed earlier this year, the Ministry of Information (MOI) website has made clear that there is no place for hate speech in Myanmar society. MOI website statements have also urged all Myanmar people to avoid hate speech and to “live in unity within diversity”. The Ministry has called for “retributive action” against those who “make” hate speech.

U Aung Ko, the Minister of Culture and Religious Affairs, recently referred to plans for a new Hate Speech Law – which would criminalise verbal attacks on other religions besides Buddhism – being developed in consultation with “interfaith groups” comprising members of Myanmar’s various religious communities. Such a law, whose precise contents are not yet known to the public, would empower ordinary citizens to report discriminatory speech.

Article 364 of Myanmar’s 2008 constitution prohibits the “abuse of religion for political purposes” and “any act which is intended or is likely to promote feelings of hatred, enmity or discord between racial or religious communities or sects”. It allows for the “promulgation of laws to punish such activity”.

A former legal adviser to the NLD, U Ko Ni was recently interviewed by the Democratic Voice of Burma (DVB) and suggested that a draft law on hate speech had been circulated in 2013 and that the drafting process could be revived under the new government.

In September 2015, the Myanmar Centre for Responsible Business published an ICT Sector Wide Impact Assessment (SWIA), which featured an extensive analysis of hate speech in the Myanmar context. An important recommendation made in the SWIA was that clear public signals should be sent from the highest level of government and by all political parties that hate speech is unacceptable. That is now happening and is welcome.

However, legislation needs to be carefully considered. Many other countries struggle with legislating against online hate speech because it is not always easy to distinguish where freedom of expression ends and legitimate restriction on expression begins. What is considered hate speech in one country may not be considered hate speech in another; it may be region- or culture-specific, rooted in a country’s history. The lack of an internationally agreed definition of hate speech has made it difficult to clarify how such acts should be dealt with, including in the digital world.

One statement published on the Ministry of Information website defines hate speech according to the definition published on Wikipedia. While we welcome the government’s concern about hate speech, we also call on government officials to draft any future law using international human rights law rather than any other definition.

Freedom of expression is protected under Article 19 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) and Article 19 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR). The right to freedom of expression and opinion extends to ideas deemed unpopular, shocking, offensive or disturbing.

The former UN special rapporteur on the promotion and protection of freedom of opinion and expression, Frank La Rue, outlines this in a 2012 report: “The right to freedom of expression implies that it should be possible to scrutinize, openly debate and criticize, even harshly and unreasonably, ideas, opinions, belief systems and institutions, including religious ones, as long as this does not advocate hatred that incites hostility, discrimination or violence against an individual or a group of individuals.”

This is the nature of freedom of expression: Someone may express an opinion others disagree with, but they nonetheless have a right to say it, except in certain narrowly defined circumstances. When it comes to determining what speech should be restricted in order to protect the rights of others, international human rights law provides a very high threshold that must be met before the expression can be legitimately restricted or in some cases prohibited.

International human rights law does not use the term “hate speech”. It has become a vague term that often encompasses both expression that can be restricted under international law, and legitimate expression that cannot, even if it is offensive.

Article 19, paragraph 3, of the ICCPR outlines a basis for legitimate restrictions “as are provided by law and are necessary … (c) for respect of the rights or reputation of others; (d) for the protection of national order (ordre public), or of public health or morals”.

Article 20 of the ICCPR elaborates on these restriction in more depth and prohibits by law “any propaganda for war” and “any advocacy of national, racial or religious hatred that constitutes incitement to discrimination, hostility or violence”.

In other words, according to Article 20 (2), hatred, by itself, would not be subject to restriction. It is only when advocacy of national, racial or religious hatred constitutes incitement to discrimination, hostility or violence that is prohibited under international law.

Incitement is also recognised as a crime in other international human rights treaties. The UN Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (1948) criminalises a “direct and public incitement to commit genocide”. The International Convention on Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (1966) requires states to criminalise the dissemination of ideas based on racial superiority and assisting or financing racist activities.

Therefore the government should avoid vaguely defined terms in any future law such as “hurting religious feelings”, which could be applied too broadly and does not address the real damage of language that incites, discriminates, and is hostile and violent, as outlined in international human rights law.

In addition to considering and consulting widely on appropriate legislation – which should protect all those who are vulnerable to online abuse, including women and LGBT – the government could also support civil society and corporate efforts aimed at what is known as “counter speech”. This is where users challenge “hate speech” by exposing false rumours, ideally with the support of the police, and encouraging peaceful expression.

While researching our assessment, interviewees told the MCRB that there was a lack of guidelines across public and private institutions on how to use social media appropriately. Many interviewees also said they did not report online hate speech to website administrators because either they didn’t know how to or the internet connection was too slow. Owners of social media platforms should take note of this and educate their users on how to report abusive behaviour online, while taking into account possible low bandwidth.

Yangon Region Religious Affairs Minister U Tun Nyunt suggested that complaints could be made to police stations. However, police will need training and guidelines on how to deal with complaints, and the government should manage people’s expectations about prosecutions. In 2013, the UK director of public prosecutions issued guidelines for prosecutions involving social media communications to assist both the police and prosecutors in this new area.

The government of Myanmar has the opportunity to lead from the front in tackling hate speech and to present an example of good practice to the world. But it must tread carefully by ensuring that any restrictions on speech do not stifle free expression and are aligned with international human rights law.

Lucy Purdon is an adviser to the Myanmar Centre for Responsible Business on ICT and human rights, and a research fellow of the Institute of Human Rights and Business.

Aung San Suu Kyi attends an event in Rangoon, Burma on July 19, 2016.
© 2016 Reuters

By Sophie Richardson
Human Rights Watch
August 16, 2016

Leaders Should Discuss Refugees, Imprisoned Nobel Laureate

As Aung San Suu Kyi prepares for her first trip to China since her National League for Democracy party swept Burma’s elections last November, her to-do list could be impossibly long: managing a new and delicate era in bilateral relations, development aid, the resolution of the stalled Myitsone Dam project, and disputes about management of their shared border. There’s also the complex peace process involving the Burmese government, its military, and the country’s ethnic armed groups – some of them backed by China.

Suu Kyi should make sure two other issues get attention. In 2015, roughly 27,000 people displaced by fighting in Burma’s northern Shan State sought refuge in China. Additionally, thousands of Kachin refugees remain in China’s Yunnan province from the conflict that raged in Burma from 2011 to 2013. Another 100,000 internally displaced persons are in squalid camps in Kachin State. Nongovernmental organizations that have visited the camps in Burma and China have called conditions deplorable and cramped, with poor sanitation. Yet international aid is being reduced, and abuses by the Burmese military continue to be reported.

China has not allowed officials from the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees to visit the camps in Yunnan to assess conditions. While Suu Kyi no doubt plans discuss the peace process with Chinese leaders, it’s not clear that the status of refugees and internally displaced persons will make the agenda. If China wants to further the nascent peace process, it’s crucial that the fate of these people gets serious attention.

Suu Kyi should also use her platform and pro-democracy credentials to call for the release of fellow Nobel Peace Prize winner Liu Xiaobo from prison in China. When she visited China in June 2015, as leader of the opposition, she did not publicly raise his case. This disappointed many Chinese democracy activists, particularly given that her release from years of house arrest was hastened by winning that same prize, and by having other Nobel laureates, heads of state, and prominent rights activists intervene on behalf of her freedom.

This is a new era in Burma-China relations. Burma and China are heading in different directions, with one country taking steps towards ending authoritarian rule, while the other makes it state policy. Will Suu Kyi demonstrate leadership in support of human rights beyond Burma’s borders? Will China, reflecting on its low standing in Burma after decades of support for the military junta, find a way to work with the new government to improve the lives of the Burmese people?

By Jiyoung Song
August 16, 2016

When Aung San Suu Kyi's National League for Democracy finally came to power in Myanmar last year, there was much scepticism among ethnic minorities as to whether the nobel laureate would speak up for their rights. So far, the new government has not done much to change this view, particularly among the Rohingya minority whose lack of citizenship and poor living conditions are a recurring theme in refugee movements around the region.



No-one in Myanmar has any doubts as to Aung San Suu Kyi's central role in government, even if she is constitutionally barred from becoming president. Her titles include state counsellor, foreign minister and minister of the office for president; her responsibilities include international relations and internal peace negotiations with ethnic minority groups.

Outsiders might assume such minority groups would include the Rohingya. After all, there are around 1.3 million Rohingyas in Myanmar (total population around 53 million), concentrated in Rakhine, one of Myanmar's poorest states located in the northwest of the country. However, while there was anger among Rohingyas that Aung San Suu Kyi has opted to treat them as foreigners staying unlawfully in Myanmar who have no role to play in the internal peace process, there was not much surprise. The new government has also decided to no longer use the term 'Bengali', instead favouring 'Myanmar Muslims'. This has been met with a mixed response. One Rohingya activist I spoke to based in the Myanmar capital of Yangon is pleased the pejorative 'Bengali' has also been dropped. A Rohingya leader based in the Rakhine capital of Sittwe, however, sees it differently. He claims that by grouping Rohingyas and other Muslim minorities in Myanmar together, the new government intends to discriminate against all minority Muslims in Myanmar. He cites as evidence the recent displacement of Kaman Muslim population in Rakhine.

About one third of the Rakhine population are Rohingya. The state's economy has been stagnant for some time; there are not enough jobs, and there are no substantial industries. The Chinese pipeline project at Kwaukpyu and the Indian company developing the Sittwe port are the only visible source of foreign investment; their actions have not benefited the local economy. The locals depend on fishing and agriculture for subsistence. Tourism may grow, but it would require Yangon to invest in infrastructure and training, which does not seem likely in the near future at least.

Rakhine streets are largely safe with no soldiers or police patrols. There are some areas where foreigners cannot go without permission, but otherwise they are allowed to move around as they please. Rohingyas, however, cannot. Much of what was once their land has been confiscated. Their mosques are abandoned. Most live in designated areas, largely in northern Rakhine, near the border with Bangladesh. These are highly restricted environments with little support from Yangon. Groups like the UNHCR, the UNDP and other NGOs try to fill the gaps in education, training and healthcare. Measured against a developed country standards, the IDP (internally displaced person) camp conditions are appalling.

Often Rohingyas have no option but to travel to Bangladesh for basic services including health. Yangon is highly suspicious of these cross-border movements which it believes could provide entry points for Islamic radicalism into Myanmar. Rohingya leaders reject such allegations. UNHCR Myanmar staff also doubt the government claim, saying the harsh living conditions make radicalisation unlikely; even basic resources are scarce.

The Rakhine Rothingya in poverty with no official state and appear to have no means of support beyond international aid. The reality, however, is a little more complicated.

Rohingya communities are very hierarchical. Their leaders are all men, highly revered, internationally connected, and well-organised. Some are quite entrepreneurial. Rohingyas who are settled in developed countries can connect to Rohingya in Myanmar through social media and by phone. They can even guide foreigners through tours of the camps, with or without state authorisation; a half-day visit costs around 110,000 kyats (US$100). At every checkpoint, visitors pay 10,000 kyats.

Always, it seems, there are people who can make money out of misery and in this case some Rohingyas are among those making money out of Rohingya misery. This obviously poses a moral dilemma for those who work with refugees; some of those who appear to be in need of international protection are also corrupt, abusive, law-breaking and dismissive of gender equality.

Some in Yangon believe that if Rohingyas’ movements remain restricted, their citizenship revoked, and their lands confiscated, they will either move en masse to Bangladesh (where many believe they originated from), or their ethnic identity will fade eventually. In fact, the opposite is likely to occur. The Rohingya population will continue to grow and, with no basic healthcare, there will be more irregular movements to Bangladeshi, Malaysia and Thailand, and more illicit activities in and out of the semi-permeable boundaries. This could create serious security challenges for Myanmar and beyond.

Myanmar is now in transition to democracy after decades of military dictatorship. It could still choose to recognise Rohingyas as citizens (or at least permanent residents with rights equal to those of citizens), and offer proper education and training while seeking a regional solution for those in Malaysia and elsewhere. In the longer term, this could lead to economic opportunities for the state of Rakhine and for the country as a whole.

There would be plenty of global support for such move. Myanmar’s institutionalised discrimination against Rohingyas has prompted international campaigns that have spurred considerable and widespread sympathy. The UN has identified them as one of the most persecuted groups in the world. With their stateless status, they have been able to apply for asylum in many developed countries which actively promote Rohingyas’ right to identity. However only a tiny number have been accepted as refugees. The majority remain internally displaced. This too could change, with some considerable acts of collective will.

In Malaysia for example, as of June 2016, there were about 55,000 Rohingya asylum seekers. Since Malaysia treats them as illegal migrants, they don’t have a right to work. The UNHCR Malaysia office receives 600 applications every day, many from self-claiming Rohingyas, and has suggested the Malaysian government allow Rohingyas to work. This would seem to be a win win as Malaysia's fast-growing cities need manual labour in industries such as construction. Empowering the Rohingya diaspora in Malaysia could also help Myanmar’s marginalised Muslim communities, and eventually contribute to regional development. This would be a sensible, realistic and mutually beneficial solution for both the state and asylum seekers. Whether Malaysia has the necessary political will remains to be seen.

Meanwhile, the Rohingya remain a long way down Myanmar's to-do list. One retired government official in Yangon said Aung San Suu Kyi 'has a very difficult job to do. She’s better sort out the easy ones first, and the most difficult last'. He thinks Rakhine and Rohingyas should stay in the too hard basket. .

However, Aung San Suu Kyi has a huge reservoir of goodwill to draw on. Inside the new Myanmar, many are hoping for compassionate, inclusive and democratic leadership. She also has strong international support. Judicious combinations of foreign aid, direct and joint investment, with more relaxed trade regulations and visa restrictions could see Myanmar become a leading country in Southeast Asia once again.

Photo courtesy of European Commission DG ECHO

Land—reportedly confiscated from local farmers—is fenced off for an industrial ward outside of the Arakan State capital of Sittwe, and pictured on Sunday, August 14, 2016. (Photo: Min Aung Khine / Sittwe-based Journalist)

By Moe Myint
The Irrawaddy
August 15, 2016

RANGOON – After meeting with local farmers on Saturday, Arakan State Chief Minister Nyi Pu has ordered a halt to fencing around the perimeter of an industrial ward located outside Set Yoe Kya village near the state capital of Sittwe.

According to a post from Nyi Pu’s official Facebook page, farmers told the Chief Minister that their lands had been confiscated 15 years earlier, and that they had been informed the area was under the ownership of senior and former government officials.

Nyi Pu said that the National League for Democracy-led (NLD) government would investigate the allegations of land grabbing, and uncover whether land could have been taken legally in the interest of development, or seized for personal gain.

“If they confiscated land for personal benefit, we will take action against them according to the existing laws. If the land was grabbed in the public [interest] we will address the farmers’ losses in line with current laws,” Nyi Pu stated.

According to Nyi Pu, since 2001, the Industrial Land Committee has designed 466 estates and sold just over 400 yards of land at the price of 250,000 kyats (US$210) in 2015. Another 65 estates were used as camps for displaced communities in the region.

Arakan National Party lawmaker Kyaw Zaw Oo submitted a question to the regional parliament last Wednesday, inquiring whether the Arakan State government’s quick allocation of the land to develop an industrial zone near Set Yoe Kya’s creek was enacted legally.

He told The Irrawaddy on Thursday that the previous Arakan State chief minister, Mya Aung, the Border and Security Affairs Minister Htein Lin, as well as around 50 high-ranking bureaucrats were implicated in the alleged confiscation of 515 acres of land in Sittwe District.

Minister Kyaw Lwin, the NLD appointee for mining, agriculture and livestock within the Arakan State cabinet, explained that the shift in land ownership was carried out legally by the previous government. When he spoke with The Irrawaddy by phone last week, he described the problem as “complicated” and not easy to solve, as people had constructed houses on the farmland.

He declined to comment on whether action has been taken against those involved in the reported land grabbing, or if the land is required to be returned to the original owners or if compensation will be allocated.

In a letter to parliamentarian Kyaw Zaw Oo, Minister Kyaw Lin explained that before former president Thein Sein transferred administrative power to NLD, in March he ordered the transformation of the contested land into residence quarters in Sittwe, specifying the names of owners.

According to articles 29, 30 and 31 of 2012’s farmland laws enacted by Thein Sein, confiscated land for a project must be developed within six months of the proposal’s specifications. If it fails to be carried out during the project’s timeframe, the applicants must return the land to the original owners. In the case of the contested land in Arakan State, it has been 15 years since the land was reportedly taken and it still lacks any basic infrastructure, said MP Kyaw Zaw Oo.

He pointed out that since there had been no fence around the land, the farmers from Set Yoe Kya had continued cultivating their rice paddies there until 2015, and regularly registered with the government’s land department until 2012.

Kyaw Zaw Oo suggested that since the new government is planning to construct a bridge connecting Set Yoe Kya and Sittwe, the land price had risen; thus, he alleged that the previous Arakan State government had exploited the unused land confiscation order to avoid returning it to farmers before the administrative handover to the civilian-led government earlier this year.

When The Irrawaddy spoke with MP Kyaw Zaw Oo, he said that some influential figures in Sittwe had been named in the list of beneficiaries of the confiscated land, including known Arakanese nationalists, former members of the Rakhine Nationalities Development Party and a former Sittwe District administrator now serving in the office of the state government.

Maung Htun Thein, a farmer from Set Yoe Kya village who has had 12 acres of his land confiscated since the early 1990s, confirmed that he and up to 16 other villagers and some from the surrounding area had not received any compensation from the government. He recalled that one acre was valued at approximately 150 kyats—or $0.13—and now each acre is priced at up to 15 million kyats ($12,600).

“I want my land back if they continue to construct an industrial zone,” he said, demanding that the government should “compensate in line with the local real estate market price.”

Police stand guard in Thaye Thamain village, Bago Region, on June 30, one week after a mob of more than 200 people assaulted a Muslim man, ransacked his home and destroyed a Muslim cemetery.( Naing Wynn Htoon / The Myanmar Times)

By Lillian Kalish
Myanmar Times
August 15, 2016

In its first report since the National League for Democracy took power pledging movement toward greater religious equality, the United States Committee on International Religious Freedom still sees cause for “grave concern” in the country’s rights record.

The committee’s report, a comprehensive assessment that tracks restrictions on religious freedom and provides recommendations to the US government for protecting human rights around the world, came out on August 10.

Since the committee’s inception in 1998, Myanmar has remained a Tier 1 “country of particular concern”. The four “race and religion” laws passed under then-president U Thein Sein’s rule, and military tensions with ethnic dissident groups in upper Myanmar, continue to restrict the rights and freedoms of Rohingya Muslims in Rakhine State and Christians in Kachin and Shan states respectively, the report said.

Introducing the report, David Saperstein, US ambassador-at-large, said the committee “expressed grave concern that large numbers of them [Rohingyas] have had citizenship stripped from them … Often they are in camps where they can’t return to their home communities, they can’t establish mosques.”

Political analyst U Than Soe Naing noted that the report, with its recommendations – ranging from concrete actions such as using the term “Rohingya” to describe the Muslim population in Rakhine and denying visas to Myanmar officials directly responsible for violating religious freedom to vaguer calls for interfaith engagement – serves as a lesson for the NLD.

“I think the NLD can establish religious equality, but I worry that Daw Aung San Suu Kyi and her party will be attacked by Buddhist nationalists for trying to make these changes,” he said.

The report, which covers the year 2015, was released only a few days after the most recent instances of religious oppression in the country.

On August 8 in Thingangyun township, Yangon Region, 16 people, including Muslim students studying the Koran, were detained under the “midnight inspections” law. In June, a mob of 500 Buddhist extremists burned down a mosque in Bago Region.

A recent article in The Myanmar Times suggested that anti-Muslim hate speech, as well as Buddhist national sentiment, was on the rise in the country’s nascent social media. However, U Aye Lwin, a Muslim leader from the Islamic Centre of Myanmar, says these instances are not uncommon. For Muslims and followers of non-Buddhist faiths, freedom is still a faraway goal.

“I don’t want to blame the situation on the NLD government, but calling for religious equality will be a difficult challenge,” he said.

Although Myanmar has languished as a “country of particular concern” for 17 consecutive years, Mr Saperstein said he was very encouraged by the NLD’s commitment to advancing democracy and human rights.

In 2015, Rohingya Muslims were temporarily able to claim citizenship with ID documents known as “white cards”. However, heeding the anger of Buddhist officials, the previous government discontinued this identification process.

New challenges to religious equality in Myanmar have defined 2016.

The country was under the international spotlight as Rohingya refugees crossed the sea to enter Thailand and Malaysia to seek asylum from repressive conditions. The new government faces pressure both to mend ethnic tensions and to ensure a broader democratic process.

“In Rakhine, there’s a long way to go,” said Mr Saperstein. “There’s terrible human suffering and we believe that it has to be made a key priority to fundamentally change things.”

A screengrab from the Myanmar Muslims Genocide Awareness Convention 2016 on August 13 in Los Angeles, featuring Shwe Maung, former MP from Buthidaung Township in Arakan State, who spoke at the event. (Photo: Burmese American Muslims Association / YouTube)

By Sally Kantar
August 15, 2016

In a conference held in Los Angeles on Saturday by the Burmese American Muslims Association (BAMA), an international panel of speakers condemned the ongoing persecution of Burma’s Rohingya minority, placing it within the framework of genocide, and calling on the country’s current government to restore the marginalized group’s rights.

The event, entitled Myanmar Muslims Genocide Awareness Convention 2016, was broadcast live online and featured speeches by Shwe Maung, a former Rohingya member of Burma’s Parliament, civil rights activist Htay Lwin Oo, and Maung Zarni, a scholar and non-resident research fellow with Cambodia’s Sleuk Rith Institute.

Former United Nations Special Rapporteur for Human Rights in Burma, Tomás Ojea Quintana, and president of Genocide Watch, Gregory Stanton, delivered pre-recorded talks.

“Many scholars and experts believe that the conditions and elements of a genocide in process have been present in Myanmar against the Rohingya, especially during the military government,” said Quintana, who served as rapporteur from 2008-2014. “But they’re also saying that those conditions are not changing with this civilian government.”

“The situation needs to urgently be addressed by the Myanmar government,” he continued, citing limitations to an estimated 140,000 displaced Rohingyas’ freedom of movement, a lack of food and access to healthcare, and episodes of violence against the community.

A screengrab from the live webcast of the Myanmar Muslims Genocide Awareness Convention 2016 on August 13, featuring Tomás Ojea Quintana, former UN Special Rapporteur for Human Rights in Burma, who delivered a pre-recorded statement.

“It has already been 100 days since the new government took over and we haven’t seen clear and concrete measures to reverse the trend against the Rohingya,” Quintana said, referring to the National League for Democracy (NLD) administration headed by state counselor and Nobel Peace Prize laureate Aung San Suu Kyi.

Talks at the conference were marked by heavy criticism of Burma’s 1982 Citizenship Law, which defines citizen status along ethnic lines, and does not recognize the Rohingya as one of the country’s ethnic groups. In order to be granted even subordinate forms of citizenship, those belonging to “unrecognized” groups are instead forced to prove their family’s presence in Burma dating back multiple generations—a near-impossible task since such residency often predates the use of the documentation required for such verification.

“The Rohingya are victims of a classification system in Myanmar that literally classifies them out of citizenship,” said Gregory Stanton in his talk. In 1996, he created a model for the US State Department identifying eight—and later, ten—stages of genocide, the first of which is “classification” of “us versus them” along ethnic, national, racial or religious lines.

“If you stop using the name that the people have chosen, you are trying to classify them out of the system,” Stanton added, referring to the widespread use of the term “Bengali,” over “Rohingya,” which implies that the group—which has an estimated population of 1.3 million in Burma—are migrants from neighboring Bangladesh.

The insinuation that Rohingya are Bengali “is absolutely not true,” said Shwe Maung, a Rohingya who served as a member of parliament representing Arakan State’s Buthidaung Township from 2011 until 2016. He was barred from running for re-election in 2015 after authorities alleged that his parents were not Burmese citizens, a claim which, in a 2015 op-ed for the New York Times, he dismissed as “laughable,” considering he had been eligible to represent his constituency in the previous election.

“A lot of Myanmar Muslims and Rohingya Muslims have sacrificed for the NLD,” Shwe Maung said. “[We] expected a little relief from the NLD…[but] not a single Rohingya was able to vote because they were disenfranchised.”

The organizers of the convention made public a resolution demanding that the NLD government restore the citizenship rights of the Rohingya, guarantee the security of non-governmental organizations working in Arakan State, facilitate unrestricted access for international investigators to conflict areas, return property to the displaced, and allow the Rohingya the right to self-identify as such.

While calling for public support for Yanghee Lee, his successor as the special rapporteur for Burma, Tomás Ojea Quintana pointed out that the most recent UN report on the Rohingya “does not refer to the risk of genocide even one time,” saying that this was “something we need to consider.”

The term “genocide” has been contested in Burma; Reuters reported in March that the US State Department had released a report to Congress stating that while the US government remained “concerned” about the persecution of the Rohingya, they “did not determine that it was on the level of genocide.” They did, however, call for “comprehensive and just solutions” to abuses against the group, including improved access for aid agencies and the restoration of citizenship rights to stateless populations.

A report published in October of last year by the Lowenstein International Human Rights Clinic at Yale Law School for the NGO Fortify Rights concluded that both action and inaction from the Burmese government towards the Rohingya satisfied the criteria of genocide as defined by the 1948 Genocide Convention.

In his talk at the conference, delivered via video, Stanton drew parallels between the Holocaust—in which 6 million European Jews were killed under Adolf Hitler’s Nazi regime during World War II—and the persecution of the Rohingya in Burma. 

“The Jews were classified out of their citizenship, their businesses were taken away, their homes were confiscated, their property was confiscated—they were eventually sent to concentration camps. All of these parallels are like what is happening to the Rohingya,” Stanton said. “We must make the world pay attention.”

BAMA was founded in 2013, and has since held annual conventions addressing violence against the Rohingya. Many of this year’s speakers also participated in a conference at the University of Oxford in May to address the persecution of the Rohingya in the context of democratization in Burma. A year earlier, in May of 2015, the “Oslo Conference to End Myanmar’s Persecution of the Rohingya” was hosted by the Norwegian Nobel Institute; there, the oppression was also described as genocide.

(Photo: Reuters)

By Larry Jagan
Bangkok Post
August 14, 2016

The NLD continues to urge patience as it starts to transform Myanmar, but critics see little evidence of change after its first 100 days in power

It is now more than four months since Aung San Suu Kyi took power -- forming the country's first civilian government for more than 50 years. 

But the public euphoria that followed her National League for Democracy's overwhelming electoral victory last November has subsided. There is increasing criticism of the lack of change and the absence of clear policies during her first 100 days of official governance.

The promises that followed victory at the polls have left many people confused and irritated.

"The main change I've experienced in the last three months is that the price of eggs has jumped from 100 kyat each to 150 kyat," complained May Kyi, an 80-year-old pensioner who voted for the NLD, although she preferred to blame the previous government for this rather than Ms Suu Kyi.

Food prices have risen significantly since April and the Central Bank of Myanmar recently put the Consumer Price Index at 12.14%.

Inflation since the new government took over is running at over 10%, according to bankers, like Soe Thain, the deputy general manager of the Asia Green Development Bank.

Consumers believe the figure is closer to double that. Hanthar Myint, an NLD economic adviser and member of the party's central executive committee, acknowledged prices were rising significantly and that the government had no clear handle on the actual situation, which in turn hampers policy decisions. "We don't have reliable figures or data," he told Spectrum.

POLICY VACUUM

This is seen as symptomatic of a general malaise in government. Critics say the country is directionless, amid an acute policy vacuum.

"There are no policies, plans or strategy," said KK Hlaing, owner of the Smart group of companies and a political commentator.

As a result there is an intense inertia in government administration, with the business community in particular frustrated by the government's repeated delays in announcing the new economic policy. When it was finally unveiled at the end of July, it left many business people disappointed as it was too general and failed to give details of how the new government was going to boost economic growth and further liberalise the economy.

In the meantime, Ms Suu Kyi as State Counsellor, the key position she created for herself in April which effectively makes her the equivalent of the prime minister, is distracted by the peace process, to the exclusion of all else, according to some analysts.

"But she should not neglect the economy," said KK Hlaing. "If business grows, the country grows. Otherwise there is a danger of social and economic unrest, which would certainly threaten the country's stability."

"The government is rudderless," said a Myanmar businessman who deals directly with several ministers, on condition of anonymity. "It's like a ship without a helmsman."

CABINET RESHUFFLE?

Part of the problem, according to many Myanmar academics and business people, is the cabinet.

"These ministers lack credibility," said Nay Zin Latt, a former political adviser to president Thein Sein and founder of the National Development Party which did not win a seat in the November elections. "It's a team of nobodies, idealess and docile."

Most observers believe many of the ministers are only temporary, meant to pacify the bureaucracy and start to develop a plan of action for each ministry.

After only four months in office, a major cabinet reshuffle seems to be in the pipeline. According to NLD insiders, the selection of the ministers was part of a deliberate strategy. All the ministers are in their sixties and seventies -- many with previous government experience as bureaucrats.

Critics charge they are likely to be cautious in their policy approaches and the pace of change.

Stability, for the moment, appears to be the government watchword.

"Ministers must have a passion for the country, passion for the people and initiate dramatic change," said KK Hlaing. "This lot are too worried about doing something wrong, being reprimanded or sacked."

Many Myanmar academics, businessmen and social activists fear the new government has chosen stability over development.

One key consequence of the NLD's failure to grapple with the problems facing the country, is that government administration remains paralysed, with no clear policy positions in most sectors and most ministers and bureaucrats waiting to be told what to do.

"The public servants are sitting at their desks doing nothing while waiting for instructions from above," Hanthar Myint said.

Since the cabinet was sworn in, Ms Suu Kyi has continued to be careful not to upset the bureaucrats.

The former parliamentary speaker, Shwe Mann -- who was the third most important general in the regime before the 2010 elections -- has been a key adviser to Ms Suu Kyi and counselled her early on to be careful not to pick unnecessary fights or antagonise the bureaucracy.

She has followed that advice stringently. Ms Suu Kyi warned her MPs not to criticise the country's public servants and told senior party officials to be patient and not put pressure on them to change just yet.

RULED BY FRUSTRATION

Originally, the permanent secretaries -- the top public servant in each ministry and appointed by the previous government some 18 months ago -- were seen by the NLD as essential for the continuity of management and policy, something Hanthar Myint confided shortly after the elections. Uncertainty dominates all the positions in Myanmar public service, but it is even more unsettling for the top ranks of the ministries: directors-general and directors.

Most ministers are unable to provide leadership, leaving much to the permanent secretaries. In most ministries this has resulted in inactivity and confusion.

There is no incentive to perform even the perfunctory tasks of the job. As a result there are bottlenecks in the system.

A senior official in the agriculture ministry recently summed up the situation: "Before, top government officials were ruled by fear, now we're ruled by frustration."

Businessmen complain that nothing is happening, that ministers seem loathe to make decisions and that the government generally is overwhelmed. The Myanmar Investment Commission -- which approves foreign investment projects and joint ventures -- was recently reconstituted and only met for the first time in June. It has met twice since then -- though few joint ventures and foreign investment projects have been approved.

Foreign direct investment -- a significant part of the government's economic strategy -- has fallen to a trickle, according to government officials. MIC figures show foreign investment stood at $381 million (13.3 billion baht) for the first quarter of this fiscal year, about a sixth of the previous year when Myanmar attracted a total of $9.48 billion.

But there have been reasons for this hiatus, as businessmen -- especially foreign investors -- are quietly waiting for the government to announce its policies and priorities. There are exceptions of course, with Asian entrepreneurs, especially from Japan, Thailand and Vietnam, anxious to increase their toehold in the country.

SAME OLD PROBLEM

Another key issue re-emerging is corruption: though not among the ministers, but bureaucrats, especially in the state and regional governments.

"Things haven't changed," said one Myanmar businessman.

"Corruption is endemic," complained KK Hlaing. "Corruption is evident in every sector and every region. The higher the position, the greater the corruption."

But most Myanmar businessmen believe Ms Suu Kyi's uncompromising stand on corruption has set an example for all her ministers.

"Corruption remains a huge challenge for the government," said Maung Maung Lay, vice-chairman of the Union of Myanmar's Federation of Chambers of Commerce and Industry.

"What is needed is a master plan for how the government intends to stamp out corruption, and as yet nothing concrete has been done, though the intention is there."

RELIGIOUS DIVIDE

In the meantime, the NLD is carefully choosing its battles in the post-election period: ones that are seen as crucial to the government's long-term strategy. For some years there has been a festering battle between the NLD and the Buddhist nationalist movement -- Ma Ba Tha, or the Committee for the Protection of Race and Religion.

In government, the Union Solidarity and Development Party used them as a battering ram against the NLD -- particularly Ms Suu Kyi -- accusing her of being pro-Muslim. The NLD struggled with the issue last year -- and took every step to avoid any direct confrontation with the movement, especially the firebrand monk Ashin Wirathu.

The NLD went as far as to ban the selection of Muslim candidates in last year's election for fear of inflaming religious tensions, according to a senior NLD leader.

The NLD's massive electoral victory was a shock and rebuff to the movement, which thought it had captured the minds of the Buddhists at least -- which make up the vast majority of the country.

Recently Ashin Wirathu seemed to be making a cautious comeback, holding several high-profile rallies in Yangon and Mandalay -- his home base. But the NLD took on Ma Ba Tha, calling for it to be disbanded because it had no religious authority.

In this battle, the party seems to be winning. The Buddhist ruling body has declared that it was never sanctioned or agreed to. In an important ruling, it said that Ma Ba Tha had no official Buddhist status and the Sangha may even disband it altogether in the near future. This has been greeted with approval by many Myanmar citizens, and has been a significant win for the NLD, and for the time being at least has reduced the group's influence.

THE LONG PEACE

Also on the positive side, a recent series of meetings between Ms Suu Kyi and the leaders of ethnic armed groups -- who have been fighting for autonomy for more than 60 years -- has increased the likelihood that planned 21st Century Panglong Peace Conference will take place at the end of this month, after which the renewed peace process could bring an end to hostilities in ethnic areas -- especially in Kachin and Shan state -- and provide an impetus for political dialogue, which envisages making Myanmar a federal state.

This is still somewhat precarious, but it has also revealed that the relationship between the NLD and the military has improved since the "tug-of-war" immediately after the election.

Ms Suu Kyi has held several secret meetings with army commander-in-chief Sen Gen Min Aung Hlaing -- largely about the peace process and constitutional change. Several public meetings between the two also highlight the growing warmth and understanding between them -- which also augurs well for the country's future.

So as the government completes its first four months in office -- or first hundred days, which the NLD dates from the beginning of May rather than April -- the conventional honeymoon period, there seems to have been little change so far. Be patient, is the mantra of senior government officials.

But the growing public unease is unlikely to be placated until the government announces its plan of action for all the ministries -- which was expected to be the key results of the first "100 days" of government.

"Nothing is actually worse now, and at best much has been done, is ready to go and will be unveiled in detail in the near future," said Sean Turnell, an expert on Myanmar's economy at Sydney's Macquarie University and an informal adviser to Ms Suu Kyi, in an email interview.

"Above all, the entire system is much more stable and predictable. Fifty years of arbitrary and irrational decision-making has been replaced by, whatever the complaints about the pace of change, with something that is essentially just 'normal' political economy."

Comedian and political activist Zaganar said, "We should be cautiously optimistic."

What is clear is that while the middle classes -- academics, businessmen and professionals -- may be disappointed and frustrated, the mass of the population which voted the NLD into power, remain hopeful and supportive.

"It's best to be safe, slow and sure," said Win Lwin, a 40-year-old taxi driver in Yangon who voted for the NLD. "We trust Auntie and are confident she will succeed in making the country better for everyone."

But for how long will they be patient?

"We have a year to meet their expectations," senior NLD leader and patron Tin Oo said shortly after the election results.

State Counselor Aung San Suu Kyi meets army chief Snr-Gen Min Aung Hlaing at the President’s Office in Naypyidaw on August 8, 2016. (Photo: Myanmar State Counsellor Office)

By Lawi Weng
The Irrawaddy
August 14, 2016

One country run by two persons: this is Burma. On the one hand, there is State Counselor Aung San Suu Kyi; on the other, there is army chief Snr-Gen Min Aung Hlaing. If one were to ask who is ultimately in charge, they might find no clear answer.

Suu Kyi is Burma’s de-facto political leader, with her power coming from the people who elected her party—the National League for Democracy (NLD)—in the country’s 2015 general election. But among the checks on her authority is the capacity to make decisions relating to the Burmese army. Only Snr-Gen Min Aung Hlaing has that privilege.

The senior general has shown support for almost every action taken by Suu Kyi since the NLD took office earlier this year. Yet, in his own arena, it seems that Min Aung Hlaing has taken little initiative to rein in his military: fighting has recently broken out against the Kachin Independence Army (KIA) in Kachin State and against the Ta’ang National Liberation Army (TNLA) in northern Shan State.

Additionally, Min Aung Hlaing will not allow three of the country’s non-state armed groups—the Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army (MNDAA), the Arakan Army (AA) and the TNLA—to join Burma’s upcoming Union Peace Conference starting on August 31. These groups are currently under pressure over demands to disarm, which they so far have continued to resist.

As can be expected in a country arguably run by two people with different visions, there is a divide. Suu Kyi’s earlier stated plan was to invite all ethnic armed groups to join her “21st century Panglong” conference, modeled after one held in 1947 by her father, independence leader Aung San. With that aim not shared by the Burma Army, what will Suu Kyi will do next, given that she has said she wants an all-inclusive event?

In the latest attempt to bring all of the stakeholders together, the NLD government’s National Reconciliation and Peace Center’s (NRPC) delegation met twice with the three armed groups in the region of Mongla, in June and again in August.

During the first meeting in June with the AA, MNDAA and the TNLA, there was reportedly high tension when the NRPC’s Khin Zaw Oo, a former Burma Army general, allegedly pointed his finger at the leaders of the armed groups, saying, “you guys have to disarm.” He asked the groups to issue an initial statement to the effect that they intended to give up their weapons.

In an informal conversation with an Irrawaddy reporter, Tar Bong Kyaw, the TNLA’s general secretary, recalled his annoyance at Khin Zaw Oo in the meeting. “He disrespected our chairman by pointing his finger at him. His action was not appropriate,” he said.

Dr. Tin Myo Win, the head of the NRPC delegation, did not attend the most recent meeting with the three armed groups. Instead he sent Aung Kyi—a former army general like Khin Zaw Oo. Again, no agreement was reached.

At an ethnic armed group summit in Mai Ja Yang, Kachin State in late July, organizations who opted out of signing the 2015 nationwide ceasefire agreement (NCA)—and are members of the ethnic armed alliance, the United Nationalities Federal Council (UNFC)—said that they remain unsure about whether to participate in the upcoming Union Peace Conference.

No concrete decision about their attendance emerged from that gathering. No decisions emerged about any future signing of the NCA, either.

Nai Hong Sar, vice chairman of UNFC, went as far as telling reporters at a press conference on July 29 that if it were made clear that the groups did not have to sign the NCA in order to participate in the conference, they would happily attend.

The conference is a step preferable to the NCA, he said.

Which brings us back to how we began: who is in charge here? And is it not time for the Burma Army to give fresh thought to the issue, namely who is the head of the country, Aung San Suu Kyi, or Snr-Gen Min Aung Hlaing?

Suu Kyi may know some things about how to bring peace to this country, based perhaps partly on the ideas of her father Gen Aung San. But those ideas and plans could fail again, if she is not permitted to put them into action.

(Photo: AP)

By Matthew Gumley
iPolitics
August 12, 2016

And why we shouldn’t rush to open the trade floodgates

The historic general elections in Burma (also known as Myanmar) in 2015 resulted in the ousting of a nominally civilian government, supported by a power-hungry military that has held onto power for nearly 50 years. In a landslide victory, the National League for Democracy party (NLD), led by the iconic Aung San Suu Kyi, claimed an overwhelming majority in both houses of Burma’s parliament.

As a result of these significant democratic strides, it’s likely that the formerly reclusive nation will benefit from increased foreign investment and trade opportunities — including mutually lucrative relationships with Canada. These exciting new opportunities, however, should not replace support for further democratic and political reform.

Historically, democratic reform in Burma has resulted in significantly increased Canadian trade and investment. For instance, after the country elected a nominally civilian government in 2010, Canada removed economic sanctions, initiated plans for a trade commission in Burma and, in 2014, declared the country a “priority market” under Canada’s Global Market Action Plan.

In fact, between 2012 and 2014, bilateral trade between Canada and Burma grew from $4.8 million to $35.7 million. Though currently much lower, a Senate of Canada report expects Canadian direct investment in Burma to rise as a result of the 2015 elections.

Despite the success of the recent elections, Burma continues to struggle with severe human rights violations, a protracted and tumultuous peace process and a powerful army with a habit of flouting human rights. These issues must be considered before Canada expands its trade and investment strategy in Burma.

Aung San Suu Kyi recently drew criticism for stating that her government would no longer use the term “Rohingya,” the name for a long-persecuted ethnic group in Burma’s Arakan State. The use of the term Rohingya has drawn considerable controversy, with many in Burma choosing to identify the over one million-strong minority group simply as “Bengali.” The use of “Bengali” as an identifier has the double effect of limiting the Rohingya’s status to that of mere illegal immigrants — eliminating any claim of citizenship — while simultaneously eroding their true identity.

The Rohingya are not recognized under Burma’s 1982 Citizenship Law and as a result have been rendered effectively stateless within their own borders. The ethnic group has been subjected to continual persecution, often supported and exacerbated by the discriminatory and inflammatory language of the Burma government. Ethnic conflict in 2012, the resulting and continued displacement of nearly 140,000 Rohingya and the restriction of movement for the minority group led Human Rights Watch to condemn the Burma government as complicit in ethnic cleansing. Aung San Suu Kyi’s refusal to acknowledge their name does not bode well for the future of the Rohingya.

Further, lingering civil wars — particularly in Burma’s Kachin and northern Shan states — continue to result in extensive human rights violations and population displacement. As a result of the country’s long-running and bloody conflicts, Burma is now the eighth largest contributor of refugees in the world. In addition, Burma’s military continues to exacerbate conflict through intensified conflict against ethnic armed groups, worsened further by countless reports of the military’s involvement in the use of torture, sexual assault as a weapon and attacks on civilians.

The military, tragically, escapes responsibility for its actions by flexing its power in the country’s political sphere. In Burma, the military is constitutionally guaranteed 25 per cent of seats in both houses of parliament. With another constitutional provision demanding an above-75 per cent threshold for constitutional amendment, Burma’s army has a de facto veto over any decision passed through parliament. Any effort by parliamentarians to place greater civilian control — and thus oversight — over Burma’s army is therefore likely to die before it becomes law.

Burma’s immediate priorities should be to address the multitude of human rights concerns and, where possible, create benchmarks for the protection of human rights that are in line with international standards. Throughout this process, the role of the international community — including Canada — should be to continually hold the Burma government accountable for meaningful progress. By quickly expanding trade and investment, external actors like Canada would run the risk of sending a message that they’re comfortable with the current state of human rights in Burma.

Increasing trade and investment into Burma might also contribute to exploitation and further human rights abuses as a result of a weak rule-of-law climate and undeveloped labour standards. A 2015 report from the International Trade Union Confederation cites undeveloped collective bargaining standards, restricted union activity, barriers to the right to strike, the use of forced and child labour and low, unsustainable basic wages as factors vulnerable to exploitation by foreign investment and development projects.

Further, weak environmental protection has resulted in severe long-term damage in Burma, with the potential for further contamination. The Burma Environment Working Group claims that the construction of dams, unregulated resource extraction, large-scale deforestation and the illegal wildlife trade are all contributing to environmental destruction and are therefore an unsustainable source of development.

Land ownership is also a contentious issue in Burma. Investment in natural resource extraction has benefitted from ambiguous and limited land rights for local communities. For instance, the Vacant, Fallow and Virgin Land Law allows the government to repossess land — including community-owned natural resources vital to a sustainable livelihood — that it deems “vacant.” In practice, Burma’s loose land laws benefit the investor, often at the expense of hereditary or long-term local ownership of land.

As the control of natural resources can provide a valuable strategic advantage, investment in certain regions of Burma can lead to rapid militarization. This in turn can quickly lead to increased political tensions for conflict-affected communities, potentiality exacerbating Burma’s already fragile peace process.

These facts should not be news to investors or the Canadian government; our record in Burma is already tarnished. In 2015, Amnesty International released the details of its investigation into the Monywa copper mine complex, a previous investment by the Canadian Ivanhoe Mines (known now as Turquoise Hill Resources). According to Amnesty, Ivanhoe Mines was complicit in the forcible eviction of thousands of local residents in proximity to the mining complex, none of whom received compensation. In addition, they failed to adequately address the health and environmental risks that came about as a result of mining operations and were found to have lied about selling stocks of copper to members of Burma’s security forces.

Canada is by no means ignoring Burma’s human rights situation and the need for further political reform. In his April visit to the country, Minister of Foreign Affairs Stéphane Dion announced $44 million to “create a stable and inclusive democratic system.” Further, Burma has become a “country of focus” for Canada’s international development strategy, which includes humanitarian assistance to support those affected by severe flooding in 2015. While these efforts certainly support Burma’s continued democratic transition, the treatment of the Rohingya, ongoing civil war and the power of the military suggest much more is needed.

Burma’s recent elections — however laudable — should not overshadow the fact that significant political reform is still required. As such, these events should not be seen as a trigger for significantly increasing Canadian trade and investment. For now, Canada’s biggest export to Burma should be continued support for a complete democratic transition.


    • Rohingya Exodus