Aung San Suu Kyi risks becoming a political pawn in Burma
By Francis Wade
Burma democracy icon Aung San Suu Kyi seen on the campaign trail ahead of next month's elections. Pic: AP.
In a January commentary on the limits of the reform programme in Burma, renowned journalist Bertil Lintner broached what is, to many, an unspeakable topic: “is Suu Kyi being used by the Thein Sein’s military-backed, civilianised government as a pawn in its efforts to break the country’s long isolation from the West?” he asked.
It was a brave move on Lintner’s part, for Burma observers have learnt to tread carefully around what could be interpreted as any doubt regarding The Lady’s political maneuvering. Whether by her making or not, Suu Kyi’s decisions have become sacrosanct, and even the slightest criticism is often met with sharp rebukes from supporters.
Hence there has been little real discussion in media about her campaign for a seat in Burma’s parliament in the April 1 by-elections. Much of the coverage has centered on the enormity of the moment – the estimated 100,000 who gathered to hear her speak in Mandalay last weekend, or the prospect of her joining official politics for the first time – and less on her future and that of Burma’s after the vote. Any scepticism is often distilled into one paragraph at the tail-end of an article: will she have any impact in a parliament dominated by military-backed MPs? Or will she be able to overturn a constitution that she herself said only 18 months ago was the key obstacle to her holding dialogue with a government that rode into office on the back of that document.
Judging by her decision to compete in the vote, it would appear much progress has been made since 2010, and to an extent this is true: Burmese can now peacefully protest for the first time in half a century, workers can legally strike and form unions, and exiled journalists can obtain visas to report inside the country. It is indeed a sea-change from the Burma that greeted Suu Kyi when she was released from house arrest in late 2010, and the country’s citizens are wholly justified in celebrating this.
But there are several problems with her campaign for a seat. First, and perhaps most problematic, is the constitution: the military, still the domineering force in Burma, effectively holds the power of veto in parliament – a clause in Chapter 12 reads that proposed amendments to many key areas of the constitution require 75 percent approval, and that given a quarter of seats are taken up by uniformed military men, with the majority of the remaining occupied by MPs from the military-backed Union Solidarity and Development Party (USDP), the chances of getting 75 percent of the parliament to vote against laws drawn up by the military are very slim. (NB: this portion of backing is also necessary to amend a clause that allows executive and judicial powers to be transferred to Burma’s army chief without parliamentary consent, should the president deem it necessary – see Chapter XI, 413b).
Suu Kyi will know that her place in parliament confers a degree of legitimacy on the constitution, but it’s a question of how far her influence can go towards overhauling it. As LSE academic Maung Zarni says, “Parliament is not about 60 million people behind Suu Kyi. It’s about who has the largest number of seats in Parliament”. No one expects her to take a substantial policy-making role anytime soon, but the feeling is that the April vote could be an early indicator of bigger things to come in the 2015 general elections, when the seeds of democracy the government claims to be sowing now will take root.
That is three years away, however, and within that timeframe lies a danger: will the forces within and outside of Burma that for decades have exerted pressure on the government begin to retreat too early? Burma has every potential to become another Cambodia, a country that maintains a rigid autocracy that stifles human freedoms, but does so behind the veneer of international ‘acceptability’ – this is largely allowed because the Hun Sen government is undoubtedly comparatively better than the Khmer Rouge, but taken in isolation, it remains a far cry from should be considered a functioning democracy.
Burma and Suu Kyi face a real risk of falling into this trap, given that her presence in parliament will be considered a sign that things are better than they were. That evaluation is short-sighted however, and endorsements from the west of this legitimisation process means that the bar could be set too low and cemented well into the future. This is particularly worrying given that the 2015 elections will be a time when pressure and scrutiny should be at its sharpest.
What is happening at the moment is clearly an opening for the political opposition – few would refute that – but the starry-eyed optimism needs to be tempered. The regime in Burma is not ceding power, but instead reframing as something more palatable for western diplomats and investors – repeated comparisons between Suu Kyi and Nelson Mandela are therefore also misguided, and serve to heap credit on a government that will likely remain the driving force in Burma well into the future. Suu Kyi must exploit the openings ahead of her, but she and her supporters must be realistic about the risks of counterproductivity she takes in doing so.
Burma democracy icon Aung San Suu Kyi seen on the campaign trail ahead of next month's elections. Pic: AP.
In a January commentary on the limits of the reform programme in Burma, renowned journalist Bertil Lintner broached what is, to many, an unspeakable topic: “is Suu Kyi being used by the Thein Sein’s military-backed, civilianised government as a pawn in its efforts to break the country’s long isolation from the West?” he asked.
It was a brave move on Lintner’s part, for Burma observers have learnt to tread carefully around what could be interpreted as any doubt regarding The Lady’s political maneuvering. Whether by her making or not, Suu Kyi’s decisions have become sacrosanct, and even the slightest criticism is often met with sharp rebukes from supporters.
Hence there has been little real discussion in media about her campaign for a seat in Burma’s parliament in the April 1 by-elections. Much of the coverage has centered on the enormity of the moment – the estimated 100,000 who gathered to hear her speak in Mandalay last weekend, or the prospect of her joining official politics for the first time – and less on her future and that of Burma’s after the vote. Any scepticism is often distilled into one paragraph at the tail-end of an article: will she have any impact in a parliament dominated by military-backed MPs? Or will she be able to overturn a constitution that she herself said only 18 months ago was the key obstacle to her holding dialogue with a government that rode into office on the back of that document.
Judging by her decision to compete in the vote, it would appear much progress has been made since 2010, and to an extent this is true: Burmese can now peacefully protest for the first time in half a century, workers can legally strike and form unions, and exiled journalists can obtain visas to report inside the country. It is indeed a sea-change from the Burma that greeted Suu Kyi when she was released from house arrest in late 2010, and the country’s citizens are wholly justified in celebrating this.
But there are several problems with her campaign for a seat. First, and perhaps most problematic, is the constitution: the military, still the domineering force in Burma, effectively holds the power of veto in parliament – a clause in Chapter 12 reads that proposed amendments to many key areas of the constitution require 75 percent approval, and that given a quarter of seats are taken up by uniformed military men, with the majority of the remaining occupied by MPs from the military-backed Union Solidarity and Development Party (USDP), the chances of getting 75 percent of the parliament to vote against laws drawn up by the military are very slim. (NB: this portion of backing is also necessary to amend a clause that allows executive and judicial powers to be transferred to Burma’s army chief without parliamentary consent, should the president deem it necessary – see Chapter XI, 413b).
Suu Kyi will know that her place in parliament confers a degree of legitimacy on the constitution, but it’s a question of how far her influence can go towards overhauling it. As LSE academic Maung Zarni says, “Parliament is not about 60 million people behind Suu Kyi. It’s about who has the largest number of seats in Parliament”. No one expects her to take a substantial policy-making role anytime soon, but the feeling is that the April vote could be an early indicator of bigger things to come in the 2015 general elections, when the seeds of democracy the government claims to be sowing now will take root.
That is three years away, however, and within that timeframe lies a danger: will the forces within and outside of Burma that for decades have exerted pressure on the government begin to retreat too early? Burma has every potential to become another Cambodia, a country that maintains a rigid autocracy that stifles human freedoms, but does so behind the veneer of international ‘acceptability’ – this is largely allowed because the Hun Sen government is undoubtedly comparatively better than the Khmer Rouge, but taken in isolation, it remains a far cry from should be considered a functioning democracy.
Burma and Suu Kyi face a real risk of falling into this trap, given that her presence in parliament will be considered a sign that things are better than they were. That evaluation is short-sighted however, and endorsements from the west of this legitimisation process means that the bar could be set too low and cemented well into the future. This is particularly worrying given that the 2015 elections will be a time when pressure and scrutiny should be at its sharpest.
What is happening at the moment is clearly an opening for the political opposition – few would refute that – but the starry-eyed optimism needs to be tempered. The regime in Burma is not ceding power, but instead reframing as something more palatable for western diplomats and investors – repeated comparisons between Suu Kyi and Nelson Mandela are therefore also misguided, and serve to heap credit on a government that will likely remain the driving force in Burma well into the future. Suu Kyi must exploit the openings ahead of her, but she and her supporters must be realistic about the risks of counterproductivity she takes in doing so.
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