Contemporary politics through ethnic lens By: Sai Wansai
Within a year of governing time span, President Thein Sein, military-backed regime has achieved a higher degree of success in wooing the international community to lend increased legitimacy and hope for a better change of the country than all past, successive military regimes in fifty years.
Sai WansaiAlternative Asean Network on Burma, in its January 2012 Burma Bulletin writes:
“In January, the regime continued to promote the appearance of a reform agenda by pursuing ‘peace agreements’ with ethnic armed groups. The regime’s apparent haste to produce ‘initial’ agreements appears to be aimed at removing economic sanctions and other barriers to foreign investment. Regime representatives signed agreements with the Shan State Army-South (SSA-S), the Chin National Front (CNF), the Karen National Union (KNU), and the Shan State Army-North (SSA-N). However, the regime failed to reach an agreement with the Kachin Independence Organization (KIO).”
The enthusiastic West has already loosened the sanctions to some extent, due to the regime’s 13 January release of over 300 political prisoners, including numerous high-profile dissidents.
Australia, the EU, and Norway all eased their existing sanctions, while Washington would start the process of exchanging ambassadors. Also, ASEAN Foreign Ministers call for the lifting of economic sanctions against Burma, saying that lifting sanctions would contribute significantly to the country’s socio-economic development.
With the changing of political stance of Aung San Suu Kyi, leading to the National League for Democracy (NLD) re-registration and decision to enter the by-elections to be held this coming April, and the ceasefire agreements signed with various armed ethnic groups, except for a few still in the process of negotiation, particularly with the Kachin Independence Organization/Army (KIO/KIA), roughly two trends of political approach have emerged, on how political solution or settlement should be worked out.
Amendment versus rewriting the 2008 Constitution
One is the approach that has pinned its hope on the amendment of the military-supremacy, 2008 Constitution from within, which Suu Kyi’s NLD and other Burman and non-Burman political opposition parties within the Parliament are identified with, and the other, the rewriting – not amending - of the 2008 Constitution, based on the 1947 Panglong Agreement, within the frame of federal system, which the armed ethnic groups and non-Burman ethnic political parties - that have not yet reregistered – pinned their aspirations, as the sole way out of the ongoing ethnic conflict.
On the part of the military-backed Thein Sein government, it has been posturing that a similar Panglong Agreement gathering would be held at the last stage of the peace process in Naypyitaw, according to his close aide U Aung Min, Minister of Railway Transport, when he met the armed ethnic groups last November in Thailand.
According to him, President Thein Sein’s three steps peace process is: conclusion of ceasefire pacts followed by implementation of development projects in ceasefire areas and the convening of a peace conference in Naypyitaw.
However, President Thein Sein himself has never mentioned “Panglong-like Conference” or spelled out with a time frame, to be held officially.
A report filed by VOA, on 28 January, regarding the ceasefire talks between the regime and the KNU, in Burmese section writes:
“Concerning the armed ethnic issue, U Aung Min explained that he was following the three steps directive of President Thein Sein. First, ceasefire; second, deliberation of development and political progress; and third, comprehensive discussion in the parliament, leading to decision and lawmaking. The Panglong Agreement type conference, demanded by the non-Burman ethnic nationalities could as well be held during the third stage of peace initiative process.”
Long drawn-out developmental second phase
And thus, after the conclusion of ceasefire or truce agreement, the second phase of development and deliberation of political progress would likely be a long, drawn-out process, most likely, at least, until 2015 general elections, from the perspective of Thein Sein government.
Having said that, the non-Burman ethnic nationalities are faced with either to go along according to the regime’s game plan and eventually get bogged down in the developmental second phase – like the past ceasefire period from 1989 to 2009 – or to pressure for a speedy political dialogue, leading to lasting political settlement. In other words, playing along with the regime’s drawn-out, delaying tactics will erode the opportunity and political will of the non-Burman ethnic nationalities like in the recent past.
The United Nationalities Federal Council (UNFC) Positon Statement on Peace in the Country, dated 4 December 2011 said that the regime used military might in suppressing some groups, while luring those who signed ceasefire with “regional development” incentive to break their “political equality” struggle in a deceitful way, depriving the country of peace for more than 60 years.
On 31 January, SHAN reported that Hkun Okker, Chairman of the PaO National Liberation Organization (PNLO), speaking at the closing ceremony of the 11th batch of the Shan State Social Justice Education Programme training on Sunday, 29 January, pointed out military-backed, Thein Sein government’s incompatibility with a multi-ethnic state and as well, the negative effect of the second phase developmental implementation as follows:-
The identities of Burma’s multi-ethnic peoples hang in the balance as long as the country’s latest constitution which is “of the military, by the military, for the military” is not amended or jettisoned.
“Read the preamble and you will find the word ‘oneness’,” he told the 30 students graduating from the school set up by one of Shans’ foremost women activists Charm Tong. “It means the regime continues to aim for one nation, one country and one single identity and there is no room for multi-nationalities.”
He offered the newly adopted national flag as an example. “No country practicing federalism uses a one-star flag, which denotes oneness. But all the authoritarian states like Vietnam and North Korea have one-star flags.”
“Cosmetic changes by President Thein Sein government have created confusions both at home and abroad. The policy shift by Daw Aung San Suu Kyi and her NLD (National League for Democracy) has also added fuel to the flame. As a result some countries are prematurely lifting sanctions and some foreign aid agencies including the ODA (Official Development Assistance) are preparing to re-enter the country.”
He strongly criticized the ongoing peace talks and agreements emanating from them as a “quick fix” to solve what is primarily a political issue between the Burman government and the non-Burman ethnic peoples. “They are generously offering business opportunities under the name of Development or Special Economic Zones and using them as delaying tactics against meaningful political dialogue,” he charged.
“This is because they want a quiet rather than peaceful Burma before the 2013 SEA Games, the 2014 Asean Summit and the next round of elections in 2015.”
“Unitary” versus “Federalism”
The central conflict issue or core problem is none other than the incompatible position taken by adversaries between “unitary, presidential” and “federal union” political system. As have been repeatedly spelled out by the broad spectrum of non-Burman ethnic nationalities, their demands for rights of self-determination, equality and democracy are closely intertwined with the federal union setup, like two facets of a coin, which has its roots at the formation of the then new political entity, “Union of Burma” in 1948, made possible by virtue of 1947 Panglong Agreement and 1948 Union Constitution.
The present 2008 Constitution and also the 1974 Burma Socialist Programme Party (BSPP) Constitution both unitary system based, intentionally sought to reject the original agreement of federalism, agreed and signed by General Aung San, in 1947, on behalf of the Ministerial Burma or Burma Proper.
The reason, although not spoken, seems to direct at changing the concept of nationalism based on multi-ethnic state to individual citizenship, coupled with civil rights by disregarding ethnic diversity. In other words, unitary system is to replace the multi-ethnic state concept and get rid of various ethnic identities, once and for all.
This concept might probably find broad acceptance among the Burman majority for its numerical population advantage, and could find their need satisfaction under individual citizenship and civil rights, according to the universally accepted, democratic norms.
But in contrast, the non-Burman ethnic nationalities, which see themselves as non-state nations, could hardly give up their ethnic identities and feel secure by just accepting only the individual citizenship and civil rights. To put it differently, the non-Burman ethnic nationalities need guarantee to protect their ethnic, cultural identities and control of natural resources and so on, apart from just the individual citizenship and civil rights.
And this is when the federal system of arrangement comes in, to be able to exist as non-state nations and uphold their birthright sovereignty, rights of self-determination and ownership of their own natural resources. The non-Burman ethnic groups have voluntarily joined the Union of Burma, where they were accorded and promised equal rights within the mould of a federal union, and they are not about to be satisfied with downgraded minorities status from equal partners and surrender their sovereign rights handed down to them by their forefathers.
Ceasefire and political dialogue
Naypyitaw has successfully negotiated ceasefire agreements with 7 armed groups: United Wa State Army (UWSA), National Democratic Alliance Army (NDAA), Democratic Karen Buddhist Army (DKBA), Restoration Council of Shan State (RCSS), Chin National Front (CNF), Karen National Union (KNU) and Shan State Progress Party (SSPP). And recently, another group New Mon State Party (NMSP) has signed a ceasefire pact on 01 February, Wednesday.
However, the KNU has denied signing the ceasefire agreement, but said it merely agreed to meet again with the regime in the near future.
On 4 February, New York Times writes: “We can’t say there’s a cease-fire yet,” Naw Zipporah Sein, the general secretary of the Karen National Union, said in an interview. “We still need to discuss the conditions.”
Ms. Sein said the delegation sent to negotiate with the government was not authorized to sign a cease-fire. A document was signed, but all that was agreed upon in January, she said, was that the two sides would “meet again” at the end of February. She declined to release a copy of the agreement.
The only ethnic armed group holding out against Thein Sein peace initiative onslaught is the KIO/KIA, and with a sound political logic. It has an experience of 17 years ceasefire agreement, with the promise that political dialogue and settlement would follow. But instead, the 2008 Constitution framer, the SPDC regime, had ignored the Kachin and other non-Burman ethnic groups’ proposal of a genuine federal proposal and pushed through the drafting of military-supremacy constitution, constitutional referendum and 2010 nation-wide elections, which were either free, fair, credible or transparent. On top of that, the Border Guard Force (BGF) plan of forceful assimilation of all ethnic armed groups into the Burma Army was implemented, leading to the breakdown of more than decade-long ceasefire agreements.
Third party mediator and ethnic conflict
Thein Sein government self-help conflict resolution has widened some political space but is still a long way from being comprehensive and fair, especially where the issue of ethnic conflict is concerned.
SHAN report on 04 February said that when Hkun Tun Oo was asked whether he thought a new peacemaking team made up of a third party would be desirable, Hkun Tun Oo, leader of the 1990 elections winning party in Shan State, Shan Nationalities League for Democracy (SNLD), gave his answer in the affirmative. “It must be formed with persons whom people can trust to restore peace in our lifetime,” he was quoted as saying. “But, the way things are shaping up right now, I fear the process might last at least another generation.”
Hkun Tun Oo, together with other prominent activists, was released on 13 January, a day after amnesty was announced by Naypyitaw.
But he didn’t spell out with whom the third party mediator team should be made up of.
An ideal third party, whom the non-Burman ethnic groups have always wanted, would be the UN authorized mediating team, involving ASEAN, EU and the US. After all, the UN has been, for years, endorsing a “tripartite dialogue” between the military, Aung San Suu Kyi led NLD and the non-Burman ethnic groups to resolve the decades old conflict.
Broad-based coalition among non-Burmans?
And as such, it will be wise to strive for collective bargaining, by forming a broad-based coalition among non-Burman ethnic groups and push for a speedy political dialogue, aimed at achieving a just political settlement.
The non-Burman ethnic groups had shown that they were united, when it comes to common issues already twice; in the Panglong Conference (1947) and Taunggyi Seminar (1961), out of which emerged the following 5 point call:
Burma Proper must be a constituent state like Chin, Kachin, Shan and others
Equal power to the two Houses of Parliament
Equal representation for each state in the Upper House
Reservation of the following subjects for the Union government and the remaining subjects for the states: Foreign affairs, Defense, Finance, Coinage and paper currency, Posts and Telegraphs, Railways, Airways and Waterways, Union Judiciary and Sea Customs Duty
Fair distribution of the revenue collected by the Union Government among the state (Source: SHAN – 28.11.2011)
If the non-Burman ethnic groups were able to do it twice before, there is no reason not to be able to revive it again this time again. There are such broad-based organizations like United Nationalities Federal Council (UNFC), Ethnic Nationalities Council (ENC), United Nationalities Alliance (UNA) and United Nationalities League for Democracy (UNLD) already; and with a little more effort and determination, they could form a formidable, collective force to strive for their rights. With many of the UNFC ethnic armed group members on ceasefire terms with Naypyitaw, the possibility to call for the formation of such broad-based coalition is even more possible than ever. Just imagine how the coming together of ethnic armed groups and ethnic political parties could achieve collectively.
The Thein Sein regime, under the banner of Union Solidarity Development Party (USDP) is a top-dog, controlling 90 percent or so vote within the Parliament, coupled with undisputed military backing; and Aung San Suu Kyi, leader of the NLD is a formidable opposition, with the backing of Burman majority, even if it is not clear how she could push through any constitutional amendment with merely 2.5 percent of the vote, if she wins the 40 or so seats in the forthcoming April by-elections. However, both are Burman political parties and well organised, in contrast to the non-Burman ethnic groups, which still need to organise themselves in a more effective form, to be able to bargain on equal basis, if ever the long sought out “tripartite dialogue” is to take place.
But one thing is sure, the non-Burman ethnic groups cannot afford to accommodate the Thein Sein’s developmental, drawn-out, second phase plan and the need for speedy political bargaining is crucial, if they want to restore their ethnic identities and rights of self-determination. In other words, there is a choice to be made; either to eventually give up the struggle by staying aloof and let the regime’s delaying tactics overwhelm and destroy their aspirations or strive in unison to realise the common goal of federalism, democracy and equality.
It is high time for the non-Burman ethnic nationalities to be more proactive, get organised and push for the restoration of their birthright sovereignty, coercively taken away from them.
The contributor is the General Secretary of Shan Democratic Union (SDU) - Editor
