Burmese change aplenty but it's only skin deep by Bertil Lintner
IF most Western pundits are to be believed, fundamental change is taking place in Burma.
After holding a seriously flawed referendum in May 2008 on a new constitution that gives the country's military controlling powers, and holding an election last November condemned by the West as rigged, Burma's new government has stunned the world by taking steps towards what appears to be more openness.
Pro-democracy leader Aung San Suu Kyi has been freed from house arrest; she and new President Thein Sein have been meeting; strict censorship rules have been relaxed; and on Tuesday the release of thousands of prisoners began.
More importantly, Burma suspended a $US3.6 billion mega-dam joint project with China in the north of the country.
According to the view of the same Western observers, recent developments may also reflect a power struggle between "hardliners" and "reform-minded liberals" within the government and the military that controls it.
Free trial
But reality is far more complicated. Firstly, the new constitution and elections were not intended to change the basic power structure but to institutionalise it.
Once the new parliament and other institutions were in place, and the military-backed Union Solidarity and Development Party had secured an absolute parliamentary majority and formed a new, seemingly legitimate, government, concessions were expected.
Suu Kyi's release had been announced before the election, and there had been talks about prisoner releases and an amnesty for Burmese exiles.
The concessions went much further than that when the military discovered that Suu Kyi, despite her long house arrest, was as popular as ever. Nor had her party, the National League for Democracy, disappeared despite being dissolved in May last year.
At the same time, a powerful, popular movement was growing against the controversial dam project at Myitsone in the northern Kachin State. The dam would have flooded an area bigger than Singapore and 90 per cent of the electricity was to be exported to China.
And it would have seriously harmed the Irrawaddy River, the nation's economic as well as cultural artery. There was a potential for an upheaval that could have threatened the unity of the armed forces. The government had to act to prevent the public and elements of the military joining forces.
China has been Burma's closest economic, political and military ally since the pro-democracy uprising of 1988. But it has been an uneasy alliance, as many Burmese army officers have not forgotten that China for decades supported the insurgent Communist Party of Burma.
Even today, China maintains cordial relations with the United Wa State Army, a successor to the CPB, which in 1989 made a ceasefire agreement with the Burmese government.
Chinese duplicity was bad enough; robbing the country of its natural resources was seen as even worse. By suspending the controversial dam project, Thein Sein has taken the wind out of the sails of this movement and weathered the storm many were waiting for - at the same time as the suspension, not cancellation, of Myitsone leaves open the door for negotiations with China.
Thein Sein has skilfully played "the China Card" with the West.
In Washington, on September 29, Burmese Foreign Minister Wunna Maung Lwin met Derek Mitchell, the newly appointed US co-ordinator on Burma; Kurt Campbell, assistant secretary of state for East Asian and Pacific Affairs; and Michael Posner, a specialist in human rights.
The next day, the government decided to suspend the dam until 2015. At the same time, ongoing talks with Suu Kyi are meant to "tame" the NLD and persuade it to "return to the legal fold", as the government always terms it.
Some Rangoon-based sources even suggest the aim of the government could be to form a USDP-NLD coalition after the next, 2015 election. Consequently, the US is showing signs of softening its hard stance against Burma.
The US position will be eroded totally once the NLD is re-registered and all political prisoners are released. Then, sanctions are likely to be eased if not completely lifted. The EU will give in even earlier.
Apart from trying to neutralise the NLD, releasing prisoners and inviting emigres to return, the government is also attempting to revitalise the economy. Economic progress is seen as vital for regime survival, and to have US and EU sanctions lifted will serve that purpose.
In order to be "re-admitted" into the global community, and break its diplomatic and economic isolation from the West, Thein Sein's government is said to have set three other high-profile goals which would improve its international reputation: to host the Southeast Asian Games, which are scheduled to be held in Naypyidaw, Burma's new capital, in 2013; to assume the chairmanship of ASEAN in 2014; and the 2015 election.
It is likely to succeed in these endeavours, and the economy will most probably benefit as well from more interaction with and acceptance by the West.
Some economic liberalisation could also follow, but major political reforms are unlikely. The new constitution has enough safeguards to protect the military and its ultimate grip on power.
Despite the new honeymoon with the West, Burma is unlikely to shake off its dependence on China. And recent changes are unlikely to alter the country's fundamental power structure with the military effectively in command. The sad truth is that there is no "step-by-step" process in motion that would lead to real democracy in Burma.
Bertil Lintner is a Thailand-based correspondent for the Swedish daily Svenska Dagbladet and author of several books on Burma.
After holding a seriously flawed referendum in May 2008 on a new constitution that gives the country's military controlling powers, and holding an election last November condemned by the West as rigged, Burma's new government has stunned the world by taking steps towards what appears to be more openness.
Pro-democracy leader Aung San Suu Kyi has been freed from house arrest; she and new President Thein Sein have been meeting; strict censorship rules have been relaxed; and on Tuesday the release of thousands of prisoners began.
More importantly, Burma suspended a $US3.6 billion mega-dam joint project with China in the north of the country.
According to the view of the same Western observers, recent developments may also reflect a power struggle between "hardliners" and "reform-minded liberals" within the government and the military that controls it.
Free trial
But reality is far more complicated. Firstly, the new constitution and elections were not intended to change the basic power structure but to institutionalise it.
Once the new parliament and other institutions were in place, and the military-backed Union Solidarity and Development Party had secured an absolute parliamentary majority and formed a new, seemingly legitimate, government, concessions were expected.
Suu Kyi's release had been announced before the election, and there had been talks about prisoner releases and an amnesty for Burmese exiles.
The concessions went much further than that when the military discovered that Suu Kyi, despite her long house arrest, was as popular as ever. Nor had her party, the National League for Democracy, disappeared despite being dissolved in May last year.
At the same time, a powerful, popular movement was growing against the controversial dam project at Myitsone in the northern Kachin State. The dam would have flooded an area bigger than Singapore and 90 per cent of the electricity was to be exported to China.
And it would have seriously harmed the Irrawaddy River, the nation's economic as well as cultural artery. There was a potential for an upheaval that could have threatened the unity of the armed forces. The government had to act to prevent the public and elements of the military joining forces.
China has been Burma's closest economic, political and military ally since the pro-democracy uprising of 1988. But it has been an uneasy alliance, as many Burmese army officers have not forgotten that China for decades supported the insurgent Communist Party of Burma.
Even today, China maintains cordial relations with the United Wa State Army, a successor to the CPB, which in 1989 made a ceasefire agreement with the Burmese government.
Chinese duplicity was bad enough; robbing the country of its natural resources was seen as even worse. By suspending the controversial dam project, Thein Sein has taken the wind out of the sails of this movement and weathered the storm many were waiting for - at the same time as the suspension, not cancellation, of Myitsone leaves open the door for negotiations with China.
Thein Sein has skilfully played "the China Card" with the West.
In Washington, on September 29, Burmese Foreign Minister Wunna Maung Lwin met Derek Mitchell, the newly appointed US co-ordinator on Burma; Kurt Campbell, assistant secretary of state for East Asian and Pacific Affairs; and Michael Posner, a specialist in human rights.
The next day, the government decided to suspend the dam until 2015. At the same time, ongoing talks with Suu Kyi are meant to "tame" the NLD and persuade it to "return to the legal fold", as the government always terms it.
Some Rangoon-based sources even suggest the aim of the government could be to form a USDP-NLD coalition after the next, 2015 election. Consequently, the US is showing signs of softening its hard stance against Burma.
The US position will be eroded totally once the NLD is re-registered and all political prisoners are released. Then, sanctions are likely to be eased if not completely lifted. The EU will give in even earlier.
Apart from trying to neutralise the NLD, releasing prisoners and inviting emigres to return, the government is also attempting to revitalise the economy. Economic progress is seen as vital for regime survival, and to have US and EU sanctions lifted will serve that purpose.
In order to be "re-admitted" into the global community, and break its diplomatic and economic isolation from the West, Thein Sein's government is said to have set three other high-profile goals which would improve its international reputation: to host the Southeast Asian Games, which are scheduled to be held in Naypyidaw, Burma's new capital, in 2013; to assume the chairmanship of ASEAN in 2014; and the 2015 election.
It is likely to succeed in these endeavours, and the economy will most probably benefit as well from more interaction with and acceptance by the West.
Some economic liberalisation could also follow, but major political reforms are unlikely. The new constitution has enough safeguards to protect the military and its ultimate grip on power.
Despite the new honeymoon with the West, Burma is unlikely to shake off its dependence on China. And recent changes are unlikely to alter the country's fundamental power structure with the military effectively in command. The sad truth is that there is no "step-by-step" process in motion that would lead to real democracy in Burma.
Bertil Lintner is a Thailand-based correspondent for the Swedish daily Svenska Dagbladet and author of several books on Burma.
Credit : Here
