Burma: Real Change or a Time Buying Game

 

The Burmese Generals shed their uniforms and changed themselves into a Civilian government under the 2008 Constitution, which favored the military having a dominant role in the political system. The controversial election in 2010 is now recognized as being rigged. Even though the regime made some opening moves towards conciliation with its opponents, there are still many doubts as to whether the new administration has a real desire for change.

 

An examination of the leaders of the current regime leaves no doubt that it is a continuation of the previous regime. President Thein Sein, Lower house Chairman Shwe Mann, Information Minister Kyaw San, Electric and Energy Minister Zaw Min, and majority of the ministers of the current regime were ex-army officers under the previous regime, and some held the rank of General under the previous military regime.

Positive Improvements under the New Administration:

 

Negative Achievements of the New Administration

 

 

The four positive points are mixed with negatives, so we can say that they are 50-50, but not 100% positive. The three negative points are crucial for real change. The government released 10,000 prisoners as a good will gesture, but still a few political prisoners remained imprisoned. After this, Thein Sein released a second batch of 6,000 prisoners on October 1^st, 2011, and many people were expecting that all the political prisoners would be released with this group, but only 208 of these 6,000 released were political prisoners. The famous 88 Generation leaders such as Min Ko Naing, Min Zeya, and their comrades, are still being held in faraway prisons.

Resemblances to the Past

 

The Past

In 1988, the “four eight movement” sparked from a student movement into nationwide demonstrations all over the country demanding Democracy and a multiparty system. Dictator Ne Win stepped down from the political arena, and signaled for his subordinates to make a bloodless coup which would be accepted without resistance from his regime. The reincarnation of the same old government under a new facade called itself the State Law and Order Restoration Council (SLORC), and it was led by General Saw Maung and his assistant General Than Shwe.

Internal pressure for change forced the new SLORC regime to allow the formation of political parties and the holding of an election in 1990. The National League for Democracy party, led by Aung San Suu Kyi, won 82% of the parliamentary seats in this election, but many of those elected as MPs were captured, and some fled into exile. The SLORC regime refused to hand over political power to those elected, and detained the leaders of the NLD party. Then the SLORC regime changed its name and its leadership. It replaced Saw Maung with Than Shwe, and changed its name from the SLORC to the SPDC (State Peace and Development Council).

 

The Present

Than Shwe stepped down from his post as the supreme leader and passed the leadership to his subordinate like Ne Win did.  Thein Sein was chosen as President in a tightly controlled election which was recognized as neither free nor fair. This so called democratically elected government was formed under the guise of a free election, and the former General Thein Sein emerged as the new President.

External pressures, from the UN, the US and the EU, mounted because of human rights violations, and combined with Internal pressures from the opposition, leading to a dialogue between Thein Sein and opposition party leader Aung San Suu Kyi. The controversial Myitsone Dam project with the Chinese was abruptly stopped by a decision of the President, but a total cancellation of this project not achieved, even though the people’s resentment against the Chinese has been rising.

The Amyo Tha Hluttaw (National Assembly), Chaired by U Khin Aung Myint, said that it respected the 1990 election results, which had been demanded by the NLD party since day one of when they won the land slide victory in 1990. Although this was not officially recognized by the government, it was a personal recognition by the Chairman of the National Assembly.

President Thein Sein gave a speech to the lower house of the National Assembly, the Pyi Thu Hluttaw, after he took the oath of office as the President, in which he said he was willing to work together with people who are of different opinions, and that he would also welcome the return of those living in exile if they wish to return to Burma.

 

These positive comments seem very promising, but his government did not issue them in the form of an official order. There can be no doubt that this is an opening, but not for everybody; it is only for those to whom the regime would like to give a green light, such as persons like Zaw Oo who, although he was one of the resistance’s student camps leaders, later became an apologist for the regime. Although many activists heard President Thein Sein’s speech and applied for visas in various Burmese embassies around the world, their applications have remained in the status of pending. The fact this offer to welcome the return of exiles was made, even if it was only a selected opening, seems positive, but only for those who accept the terms and conditions set out by the regime.

 

In the same fashion, the release of the first batch of 10,000 prisoners and of the second batch of 6,000, did not satisfy the domestic and international demands for change because the new so-called democratic government is still practicing the old regime’s tradition of refusing to release “prisoners of conscience” who are still held as political prisoners in Burma’s notorious prisons. Among the 16,000 now released, only a few political prisoners were included in the first batch released, and only 208 of the second batch were political prisoners. The famous “88 Generation” leaders who spearheaded the nationwide uprising are still lingering in faraway prisons.

 

In an interview given to the VOA Burmese section, Kyaw San, Information Minister said: “There are no political prisoners existing in Burma; all are criminals who broke the existing laws, but [nevertheless] we are planning to move those who are [currently] in prisons far away from their families to nearby prisons [where they will be closer to their families].” However this fact is not the sign of an unconditional release for political prisoners that democratic forces are waiting for.

 

Currently, the Thein Sein regime is trying to persuade Aung San Suu Kyi and her party to register and enter the coming election for vacant seats in the parliament. If she and her party enter the election, they will get internal legitimacy which will open the gate of lifting sanctions and bringing cooperation from the west financially and politically. What kind of game NLD wants to play will see at the coming meeting on Monday.

 

In conclusion, an indication of real change could come from the unconditional release of all political prisoners, but still the regime is not doing this. Making a superficial changes and releasing criminals will not get a positive outcome. The Thein Sein government knows this. The question is why are they not releasing all of their political prisoners so that they will get recognition from internal and external forces which will give them the legitimacy that all the previous regimes were looking for. Maybe their present strategy is just another time buying tactic, like those that their predecessors successfully used in the past to fool the international players.

 

 ASEAN is ready to give Burma as its Chairmanship in the coming 2014 change of officers, which means that the Thein Sein regime is getting legitimacy from ASEAN by means of superficial changes. The next move will be an attempt to obtain recognition from the US and the EU. If this happens, the regime will become a legitimate government inside out, but under the current 2008 constitution, the Burmese people do not have the freedom that they have been dreaming of for their entire lives.