The Arab Spring and Myanmar

By David I Steinberg

The Arab Spring, the several successful and still ongoing rebellions against authoritarian governments in the Middle East, have a mutual characteristic beyond that of having occurred in Arabic-speaking societies. All originated from below - from populations that have been frustrated by severe political and social constraints often compounded by clear economic injustices.

Beginning in Tunisia with the self-immolation of a street vendor, the movement spread to a half-dozen societies. Hope for real and positive changes in those countries is apparent both in the region and abroad. The power of such movements is inspiring. Perhaps, some thought, this would affect other authoritarian states outside the region and usher in a new democratic wave. Myanmar and North Korea were prominently mentioned in the media.

A distinguished American who visited Myanmar in the summer of 2011 commented that he thought the Arab Spring would also affect Myanmar. But this view neglected to consider the unique circumstances that make such a revolution from below unlikely there in the near term.

Contrary to many expectations that significant changes could not take place under a new but military-controlled government installed in 2011 in a flawed election and ominously designated by its leadership as a "disciplined-flourishing democracy", important and positive developments are occurring and more are promised.

These positive signs should in no way obscure where essential power rests: the military have built into their new constitution the elements of perpetual, but civilianized, control yet within the context of a somewhat more plural and popularly-responsive society.

Contrary to the Arab Spring, the potential changes in Myanmar are coming from the top. Belatedly, the military-in-mufti leadership seems finally to have understood that to keep essential power, they had to institute some socio-economic liberalization and even some modest degree of political pluralism.

Burma/Myanmar has tried revolts from the bottom - the tragic people's revolution of 1988 that failed against a single-party socialist military-dominated government only to have it replaced by a coup of other military personnel. The incipient 2007 "Saffron" revolution of Buddhist monks, widespread and important demonstrations but not a revolution, was also brutally suppressed when it became overtly political.

The history of modern East Asia demonstrates that the democracies that exist in that region were largely instigated from the bottom. "People Power" in the Philippines in 1986 that overthrew dictator Ferdinand Marcos; the popular, peaceful uprising in South Korea in 1987 that eliminated Chun Doo-hwan's authoritarian rule; demonstrations against the military in Thailand on numerous occasions; and the fall of Suharto in Indonesia in 1998 all started at the bottom of the power structure.

Only in Taiwan did president Chiang Ching-kuo, to preserve his regime, recognize that change was necessary and due, and institute reforms from the top of the political hierarchy.

The potential reforms in Myanmar are as widespread as they were unexpected. From accounts inside that state, the people generally seem to be prepared to await the possibility of political and economic evolution of their past sorry state. Economic reforms are planned. Widespread poverty is admitted officially for the first time in a half-century. Corruption is recognized as a problem.

Human rights are discussed. Minorities are given a bit more say in their affairs. Censorship has been eased, and labor unions are to be allowed. A major, and hated, Chinese dam project was stopped by the president because of public sentiment. Many political prisoners - whose existence has been denied for so long - have been released, and even Myanmar dissidents abroad have been invited back, with a few tentatively starting to return.

These planned changes are fragile, for they cut into the vested interests of many, including high-level military officials and their civilian colleagues, who prefer the old ways. So we cannot but remain concerned for the diverse peoples of Myanmar. Inside that country, the new administration has a short but indeterminate period in which it must deliver on many of these proposed reforms.

The people must feel there is a future for them that is not only though military-controlled channels. That period is not indefinite, however. Even if the reforms are implemented and life begins to improve, the ultimate power will still rest for some indefinite future with the military. It is only when diverse, alternative channels of mobility and access to better living conditions occur that the military may relax its ultimate control and modify its constitutional powers. But other states have demonstrated that life can improve under less than pristine democratic conditions. Perhaps that is a realizable goal for Myanmar in the near future.

Without illusion and hyperbole, therefore, the outside world should encourage such changes. The alternative in Myanmar of the traumas and deaths in a Syria or Yemen-like environment should be avoided. Although they had long planned for a civilianized state, perhaps the Myanmar military understood the lessons from the Middle East: if the leadership refuses to reform, society may force change. It may not be the revolution that some have desired, but it does bring the possibility of positive change in Myanmar.

David I Steinberg is Distinguished Professor of Asian Studies, School of Foreign Service, Georgetown University. His latest book is Burma/Myanmar: What Everyone Needs to Know (Oxford).